![]() ![]() ![]() In the first part of the war, the standard assault on a trench line consisted of a lengthy artillery barrage all along the line, attempting to smash the enemy positions, followed by a rush forward of infantry in massed lines to overwhelm any remaining defenders. The showing of the Boers against the British in the Second Boer War (1899-1902) fanned an enthusiasm for "Boer tactics": open order tactics reliant more on achieving fire superiority and moving quickly when enemy fire was ineffective than on positioning oneself for the final bayonet charge. The advent of the machine gun and the adoption of hydraulic-recoil artillery was a further setback for close order. For a time, up to the turn of the 19th century, armies tried to circumvent the problem by moving into range in dispersed formations and charging only the last metres, as the French did in the Second Italian War of Independence (1859), the Prussians in the Austro-Prussian War (1866), or the Germans against the French in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71). History Prior to World War I Įver since the introduction of breechloaders, there had been a growing realization that the days of close-order infantry assault were coming to an end. With the use of well-trained soldiers, commanded by NCOs with autonomous decision-making capacity, an attempt was made to overcome the no man's land and to break through enemy lines in predefined points, in order to allow subsequent waves to liquidate the now confused and isolated opponent, opening large gaps in its defensive systems and then resuming maneuver warfare, which would have allowed Germany to win the conflict. The creation of these units was the first, and perhaps most innovative, attempt by the German army to break out of the impasse of trench warfare. Promoter for this last thesis was General der Infanterie Erich Ludendorff who, having become de facto commander of the Imperial German Army after the German defeat at Battle of Verdun, gave decisive support to the development of assault battalions as a solution to resume maneuver warfare. The second was the idea, emerging from experience of countless "limited target attacks" and forays into the trenches, that combat had become such a difficult task that operational considerations had to be subordinated to tactical ones. The first was the belief, mainly held by Erich von Falkenhayn, that tactical action alone, the mere killing of enemy soldiers, was a sufficient means to achieve the strategic goal. ![]() Thus the German officers on the Western Front found themselves in need of resolving the static situation caused by trench warfare on the battlefield.Īnalyzing the events, two concepts can be identified with which an attempt was made to find a solution to the problem. The German Empire entered the war certain that the conflict would be won in the course of great military campaigns, thus relegating results obtained during individual clashes to the background consequently the best officers, concentrated in the German General Staff, placed their attention on maneuver warfare and the rational exploitation of railways, rather than concentrating on the conduct of battles: this attitude gave a direct contribution to operational victories of Germany in Russia, Romania, Serbia and Italy, but it resulted in failure in the West. In the last years of World War I, Stoßtruppen (" shock troopers" or "shove troopers") were trained to use infiltration tactics – part of the Germans' improved method of attack on enemy trenches. Stormtroopers ( German: Sturmtruppen or Stoßtruppen ) were specialist infantry soldiers of the German Army. ![]()
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